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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Party References, Reference to the Appellate Record 
Mr. Platz concurs with the Idaho Transportation Department's description 
of the nature of the case, and intends to conform to the Idaho Transportation 
Department's system of references to the Appellate Record. The Idaho 
Transportation Department will be referred to as "lTD." 
Factual Statement and Procedural History 
Trooper Chad Montgomery stopped Mr. Platz on June 26, 2011 on 
Highway 3 in Juliaetta, Idaho, for speeding. Mr. Platz was driving his Toyota 
pickup truck. During the contact, Mr. Platz was cooperative; he admitted to 
having consumed some alcohol, and complied with Trooper Montgomery's 
request to perform Field Sobriety Tests (FST's). Montgomery determined that 
Mr. Platz had failed the FST's. 
The instruction for the FST's and the performance of the FST's occurred 
during the observation period during which Montgomery was to carefully 
observe Platz for burping, belching, or regurgitation. The observation period 
occurred as Platz was on the side of the highway. Montgomery also retrieved his 
Lifeloc F20 instrument from his patrol car during the observation period while 
Platz was waiting unattended. Also during the observation period, there was 
automobile traffic on Highway 3 and several passes of airplane traffic overhead, 
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clearly heard on the videotape of the event. (Memorandum Decision, R. at 
155-166.) 
Montgomery had Mr. Platz provide an evidentiary sample on the Lifeloc 
F20; the results were .201, insufficient, and .191. Id. 
Mr. Platz timely requested a hearing regarding the consequent ALS 
suspension. A hearing was held July 18, 2011, followed by a submission of 
additional evidence (a copy of the video of the stop, and transcript of radio 
communication between Montgomery and his dispatcher) and argument. The 
written argument largely addressed the length of time of the observation period, 
which Platz argues was shy of the fifteen minutes for the observation period, 
and the overall inadequate observation during that period. 
Platz filed a motion with the lTD to stay the suspension of his license 
pending the ruling from the Hearing Officer. The Hearing Officer denied the 
motion by an order issued July 27,2011. (R. at 11.) Due to Mr. Platz's 
employment as a log truck driver, he filed an Ex-Parte Motion for a Stay of the 
suspension, pending a finding from the Hearing Officer. (The action was labelled 
"Ex-Parte" because it was filed in District Court as an appeal of the Hearing 
Officer's denial of Platz's motion, without an "official" designation of an 
attorney for lTD; because Platz knew counsel for lTD should be apprised of the 
action, counsel for lTD was notified on the filing of that "ex-parte" motion.) lTD 
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objected to the filing of the motion. The matter-- both the objection to the filing 
of the motion, and the substance of the motion -- was heard by telephonic 
hearing on August 4, 2011. The District Court granted the stay, pending the 
Hearing Officer's decision, choosing to treat the Hearing Officer's denial of 
Platz's motion for a stay as a final order. (R. at 23-26.) 
The ALS hearing officer issued his order sustaining the suspension on 
August 4,2011 (R. at 86-94); the order was received by Platz approximately 
August 8 by U.s. Mail. Platz filed a Petition for Judicial Review on August 11, 
challenging the Hearing Officer's decision to sustain the suspension. Platz also 
moved the District Court for an order staying the suspension pending its review 
of the ASL suspension; the District Court granted that stay. (R. at 106-107.) 
Platz and lTD briefed the underlying issue of the "observation period" as 
it affected the suspension. The District Court heard argument on the matter on 
January 11, 2012, and issued its decision vacating the suspension on March 2, 
2012. lTD timely filed its Notice of Appeal. 
Issues on Appeal 
1. Whether the District Court had jurisdiction to hear Platz's motion for a stay 
prior to the Hearing Officer's issuance of his "Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law and Order." 
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2. Whether Mr. Platz met his burden to show that the evidentiary tests were not 
administered in compliance with I.e. lS-S002A. 
3. Whether the Hearing Officer held Platz to an incorrect burden of proof. 
Standard of Review 
The controlling statute is as follows: 
(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to 
the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by 
other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action 
unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or 
decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, 
and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section, 
agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant have 
been prejudiced. 
I.e. § 67-5279. 
On an appeal from the district court, the Idaho Supreme Court is to review 
the decision of the district court to determine whether it correctly decided the 
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issues presented to it. Wright v. Bd. of Psychological Examiners, 148 Idaho 542, 
544-45, 2245 P.3d 1131, 1133-34 (2010). 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court had jurisdiction to hear Platz's Motion for a Stay. 
As noted by the lTD in its brief, Platz "took advantage of the opportunity 
to supplement the Record and submitted additional information to the Hearing 
Examiner (sic)." Appellant's Brief at p. 5. Additionally, Platz filed a motion with 
lTD that his suspension be stayed. The Hearing Officer denied that motion. ( R. 
at 11.) lTD protests that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to even hear 
the matter of staying Platz's driving privileges, citing primarily to In re Johnson, 
---P.3d --- May 31, 2012, 2012 WL 1949853. 
The appellate capacity of district court is determined by the Idaho 
legislature in accord with the Idaho Constitution. Idaho Const., art. V, §20. The 
District Court has appellate review of a decision of an ALS hearing officer "in the 
manner provided for judicial review of final agency action by chapter 52, title 67, 
Idaho Code." I.e. §18-8002 (8). 
A person seeking relief must have exhausted his administrative remedies 
prior to seeking judicial review, but intermediate agency action is reviewable if 
the final agency action would not provide and adequate remedy. I.C §67-5271. 
The filing a petition for review does not itself stay enforcement of an agency 
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action. The agency may grant, or the reviewing court may order, a stay upon 
appropriate terms. I.C §67-5274. 
What is at issue, as demonstrated by lTD's naming of this matter, IS 
whether the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction, based on the 
exhaustion (or lack thereof) of administrative remedies. The district Court 
correctly concluded that Platz had exhausted his administrative remedies on this 
narrow question. Secondarily, Platz argues that if the order denying the stay was 
not "final," then the District Court had jurisdiction if waiting for a "final" agency 
action would not provide an adequate remedy. 
lTD takes the position that liThe District Court had no subject matter 
jurisdiction to enter an Order affecting the pending Administrative License 
Suspension of Mr. Platz's Driving Privileges." Appellant's Brief at 6. What Platz 
sought and received was relief from a law enforcement officer's decision that he 
would be without driving privileges, as would occur without action by the 
administrative hearing officer's decision. The District Court made no invasion of 
the Hearing Officer's decision regarding the suspension itself, but merely stayed 
a potentially grave consequence of that decision prior to the decision itself. 
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The administrative remedies were exhausted 
In the administrative license suspension system promulgated by the State 
of Idaho, a law enforcement officer issues a notice of suspension. l After thirty 
days from the date of issuance, the Driver's privileges are suspended. In many 
cases, this ends the process (other than the Driver needing to reinstate his or her 
privileges when the suspension has run). If the Driver has requested a hearing 
within the seven day request period, the matter is scheduled for hearing by an 
lTD hearing officer. If the hearing officer has not issued a ruling at the end of the 
thirty day period, the suspension is to take effect. I.C §18-8002A(7). However, 
as noted above, a hearing officer could issue a stay. Platz requested such a stay, 
and was denied. No further administrative remedies were available. In 
characterizing the order as a "final" order for purposes of jurisdiction, the 
District Court was recognizing the reality and gravity of the situation facing 
Platz. 
Notwithstanding Matter of Nagle,126 Idaho 139, 879 P.2d 602 (1994), Platz's 
receipt of the order denying his request for a stay would not provide an adequate 
remedy for the execution of his order, because the consequence of that Order was 
that he would necessarily lose his employment, with no assurance that he would 
1 The ITO may serve the notice if the officer failed to issue the Notice, or failed to include the date 
of service. I.C §18-8002A(5)(c). 
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get that employment back, or without any compensation for the earnings he 
would have lost. Waiting for what lTD claims is the only reviewable "final" 
order would necessarily result in a loss of a job. 
Reviewability is not limited to "final" decisions. 
Furthermore, parsing the reviewability of the action under 18-8002 closely, 
the reviewability of district court is afforded "in the manner provided for 
judicial review ... " not solely for final agency decisions. Furthermore, as revealed 
in 18-8002A(7)(e), liThe findings of fact, conclusions of law and order entered by 
the hearing officer shall be considered!! final order pursuant to the provisions of 
chapter 52 ... " (emphasis added.) It is not the only final order possible. The 
statute certainly leaves open that other orders are reviewable. That allows the 
District Court to entertain orders that will have grievous consequences, despite 
not being "ripe" under the lTD's version of the Johnson decision. In the case at 
bar, Platz had requested a hearing, submitted evidence, had received notice from 
a law enforcement office that he would be losing his license; the matter under 
review to the hearing officer had no date certain for a decision. His livelihood 
was at stake, with a real possibility that the law enforcement's officer's decision 
would be overturned, but with no recourse to getting his employment back. The 
administrative remedy available was to request a stay from a hearing officer, 
which he did. There was no other relief available through the administrative 
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process. What else could qualify for taking this matter too the District Court? 
There was certainly no guarantee that the District Court would grant the stay, but 
under Idaho law that was his next step available. The District Court correctly 
noted that under I.e. §67-5271(2), an intermediate agency action is reviewable if 
review of the final agency action would fail to provide an adequate remedy. (R. at 
24.) 
ITO would have this Court believe that under the Johnson decision, any 
action prior to a Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact are premature. In Johnson, the 
Driver filed for a review of a decision which had not been made (probably in 
anticipation that the hearing officer would rule against him, which is what 
happens routinely). Platz's case is profoundly different, in that in fact a Hearing 
Officer's decision had been made ("don't stay the suspension"), and thus that 
issue was ripe. 
Furthermore, the District Court's action in granting the stay was perfectly 
consistent with Idaho law in granting such a stay: "The agency may grant, or the 
reviewing court may order, a stay upon appropriate grounds." I.e. §67-5274. 
(Emphasis added.) The appropriateness should be duly noted: The stay was 
issued until the time the Hearing Officer's conclusions were issued, and in the 
order granting the stay, the court noted the grave consequence which would 
occur without the granting of such a stay. (R. at 25.) 
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Because Platz had exhausted his administrative remedies and because the 
District Court can view Platz's motion as seeking an intermediate relief, the 
District Court had jurisdiction to decide the matter. 
Mr. Platz met his burden to show that the evidentiary test was not administered 
in compliance with I.e. §18-8002A. 
The District Court acting in review of an agency's findings is limited to 
affirming that finding unless that finding was made: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or 
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
I.C §67-S279(3) 
Specifically, the District Court found that the Hearing Officer erred in 
finding that the proper protocol was not followed in the observation period. The 
District Court made this ruling after considering the record as a whole in front of 
it, including the video of the event. The District Court made specific rulings 
regarding deficiencies in the Hearing Officer's analysis, much of which were 
based on the facts before both the Hearing Officer and the District Court. This 
court has stated that the district court may not substitute its judgment for that of 
the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. Elias-Cruz v. 
Idaho Department of Transportation, 2012 Opinion No. 99, Docket No. 39425-2011. 
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lTD has maintained that any evidence before a hearing officer which is more 
than a scintilla can be given whatever weight a hearing officer chooses to give it. 
Brief of the Idaho Transportation Department R. at 133, citing Funes v. Aarmdema 
Dairy, 150 Idaho 7, 244 P.3d 151 (2010). This effectively nullifies any effort by a 
district court to serve as an appellate court on a matter of fact, provided that the 
hearing officer records some iota of evidence and claims that it worthy of note. 
This may serve to undermine the District Court's ability to correct a hearing 
officer (and in effect, correct or admonish law enforcement's adherence to its own 
required protocol). In the case before bar, the District Court ruled that the 
Finding of Fact was not supported by substantial evidence in the record, and lTD 
argues that the District Court impermissibly relied on evidence to make this 
ruling. 
The District Court can reverse an agency finding if that agency has abused 
its discretion in making its finding. I.C §67-5279(3)(e). The standard of abuse of 
discretion is described as, the factfinder must recognize the issue before him as 
one of discretion, the factfinder must act within the limits of discretion afforded 
rum by law, and it much reach its decision by the exercise of reason. Kuhn v. 
Coldwell Banker Landmark, Inc., 150 Idaho 240, 247, 245 P.3d 992, 999 (2010). Platz 
concedes that the Hearing Officer likely understood that the matter is one of 
discretion. 
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The Findings of Fact issued in this case cites to the ruling in Bennett v. State 
of Idaho, Department of Transportation, 147 Idaho 147, 206 P.3d 505 (Ct.App. 2009), 
which states that an officer need not stare fixedly at a subject. However, the 
Court in Bennett acknowledges that an officer must be in a position to use his 
other senses to back up his total observation. The Findings of Fact in this case 
does not state that Officer Montgomery accomplished that. The Hearing Officer 
makes a naked conclusion that "it has not been definitively shown that Officer 
Montgomery did not follow the requisite procedures regarding the IS-minute 
observation period." The Hearing Officer declines to make a statement that 
Montgomery corralled all his senses to observe Platz during the" observation 
period;" in spite of the requirement of an exercise of reason, the Hearing Officer 
does not make the critical statement that Montgomery did closely observe Platz. 
(It is a reasonable inference that the Hearing Officer did not want to make a 
statement that was unsupported in the evidence, because there were numerous 
factors on the roadside and in the supposed performance of observation that did 
not measure up to close observation.) The Finding of Fact is deficient by not 
citing a fact which is necessary to sustain a simple syllogism in this case --
without the exercise of reason, the officer abused his discretion in this case. The 
exercise of reason has failed. 
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The Findings of Fact seems to take refuge in the .02 differential. The lTD / 
ISP /SOP protocol represents that the .02 differential obviates the need for a close 
observation waiting period. As argued in Platz's briefs regarding this petition, 
the reliance on the .02 differential is bootstrapping at its best. If indeed that is 
sufficient to confirm Lifeloc readings, the ISP would totally dispense with the 
observation period. They have to date declined to take that measure. 
The decision of the District Court should be sustained because the Hearing 
Officer abused his discretion in making his findings. 
The Hearing Officer held Platz to the wrong standard of proof. 
As noted in the Memorandum Decision issued in this case, the Hearing 
Officer found that "it has not been definitively shown that Officer Montgomery 
did not follow the requisite procedures regarding the IS-minute observation 
period." It is not clear what the standard of "definitive showing" means, but it is 
not the standard which is required. I.C §18-8002A. ("Definitive showing" 
suggests a higher standard, but one that is unknown.) Although the Findings of 
Fact next states that Platz /I did not affirmatively show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the test was not performed in compliance with Idaho Law and ISP 
Standard Operating Procedures," that conclusion was based on his prior finding 
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that Platz had not "definitely shown" that Officer Montgomery did not follow 
the requisite procedures ... " 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court had jurisdiction to hear Platz's motion for a stay. 
Furthermore, the District Court correctly reversed the Hearing Officer in vacating 
the Administrative License Suspension, due to the Hearing Officer's abuse of 
discretion in reaching his conclusion, and because the Hearing Officer used the 
wrong burden of proof in reaching his conclusion. 
Platz prays that this Court sustain the decisions of the District Court. 
Dated this ~ day of August, 2012. 
fl:,,~ ~~ roes E. Johns ~ 
attorney for Mr. Platz 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was 
mailed by first class U.s. Mail to 
Ed Li tteneker 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
P.O. Box 321 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
on the ~~day of August, 2011. 
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